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The last seven years will perhaps be remembered as 
a time of re-drawing the political map of the Middle 
East. The uprising in Tunisia, which gained momen-
tum on the eve of 2011, sparked the upheavals in 
Egypt, Libya, Syria and Yemen. The wave of protests 
also extended to the Gulf region: a series of anti-
government protests arose in Bahrain between 2011 
and 2014, suppressed only by the military forces of 
neighbouring armies, particularly Saudi Arabia and 
UAE. In Egypt, what began as an admirable peaceful 
collective action turned into violent outbreaks in a 
nation that has become divided between diverse 
ideological camps, chief among them being the 
Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafists. Each camp 
unleashed a new wave of newspapers and broad-
casting projects as platforms for both the anti-gov-
ernment and anti-opposition voices. Between 2011 
and 2014, Egypt saw the rise and fall of four different 
ruling powers (the military, the Muslim Brotherhood, 
the head of the constitutional court followed by el-
Sisi). In Syria, more than a quarter of a million Syri-
ans lost their lives and more than 11 million others 
were forced to flee their homes in what began as 
peaceful anti-government protests in 2011 and 
turned into a full-scale civil war, which has been rag-
ing ever since. The rebellion soon became an armed 
and Islamist faction, with the rise of so-called ISIS. 
This group took control of large strips of Syria and 
neighbouring Iraq, declaring the area as its ‘cali-
phate’ in 2014. This fictive state managed to attract 
thousands of European Muslims, or so-called ‘for-
eign fighters.’ The Gulf states’ meddling in the Syrian 
conflict, regarded as a proxy war between Iran and 
Syria supported by Russia, on the one hand, versus 
the Gulf states and the US, on the other, eventually 
fractured the relations among the Gulf states, ignit-
ing the ongoing blockade against Qatar. 
Amidst these ensuing conflicts, Arab media have 
been used as a propaganda tool in accentuating dis-
cord among Arab states, which further divided the 
region into sectarian, economic, and political loyal-
ties, and divided each Arab society into groups that 
deemed themselves true representatives of an indig-
enous identity, versus those who did not. 
In this article, I elaborate on two functions of Arab 
media since the beginning of the so-called Arab 
Spring, namely as a tool for enforcing national iden-
tity and as a tool for re-drawing historical ties with 
neighbouring states. 
Nationalism — Dead or Alive? 
The Gulf states have long ascribed to a pan-Islamist 
identity that would bind them to other Muslim-major-
ity nations, as an alternative to the threatening nation-
alist mobilization; however, they recently undertook 
several steps in the opposite direction by promoting 
their own unique sense of identity. It is true that the 
Gulf national identity is usually enforced through trib-
al linkages, which, ironically, marginalize certain inter-
nal voices, such as the so-called Bedoon or tribes-
men, who do not have formal citizenship rights and 
whose ancestors had settled in the Gulf but were 
excluded from registration of citizenship at the time of 
1 Dr Mellor is also Adjunct Professor of Middle Eastern Studies at Stockholm University, Sweden. She is the author of Voice of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, 2017
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the formation of several Gulf states. Nonetheless, 
each Gulf state is now striving to inculcate a strong 
sense of nationalism among its citizens through a 
range of initiatives such as national days, national 
museums, and heritage projects. This sense of na-
tionalism even extends to foreign wars such as that in 
Yemen, which was launched to undermine the per-
ceived threat from Shiite Iran. The Saudi State strove 
to imbue patriotic sentiments in various demonstra-
tions, in an attempt to garner support for its war on 
Yemen. The State has actively used social media 
platforms to enforce this support while engaging in a 
virtual proxy war with Iran via Twitter,2 by accusing 
Iran of harbouring terrorism and sectarian hatred; on 
the other hand, Iran blamed the rising terrorism on 
the Wahhabi ideology which originated in Saudi Ara-
bia. A Saudi animated video recently went viral on 
YouTube3 and other social media platforms featuring 
a full-scale Saudi military attack, led by the Saudi 
Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, against Iran; 
the video was in English with subtitles in Arabic and 
Farsi. The animation was reported to be in retaliation 
to a previously released Iranian film4 in 2016, simulat-
ing missile attacks on Saudi targets. 
On the other hand, various media have been used by 
Arab states as platforms from which to launch verbal 
attacks on neighbouring states. A number of promi-
nent singers from UAE and Saudi Arabia, for in-
stance, launched a new song attacking the Qatari 
Emir and his father’s policies. The song entitled golol 
Qatar or Tell Qatar,5 sent a harsh message to the 
Qatari leadership regarding the possible conse-
quences of its tactics against neighbouring coun-
tries, while praising the Saudi leadership’s role in 
standing up to Qatari policies.6 Qatar, on the other 
hand, marked its national day in 2017 with a massive 
celebration, unlike any other year, as a sign of defi-
ance to the imposed blockade by Saudi Arabia, 
UAE, Bahrain and Egypt. Moreover, Saudi Arabia 
celebrated its 87th National Day7 in September 
2017: various ceremonies were held in public plac-
es, in which streets and houses were covered with 
green paint (the colour of the Saudi flag) and pic-
tures of the Saudi King Salman and the Crown 
Prince, in a bold display of patriotism and an inflated 
expression of loyalty to the current Saudi leadership. 
The UAE also used its national day to create a sense 
of belonging to one nation through the slogan ‘Muta-
heda’ or ‘United,’ and a film of the same title featured 
on local television channels.8
Arab media since the beginning of the 
so-called Arab Spring has functioned 
as a tool for enforcing national identity 
and as a tool for re-drawing historical 
ties with neighbouring states
In Egypt, mainstream media outlets, whether state-
funded of privately owned, had no shortage of patri-
otic songs. They praised the Egyptian military under 
the leadership of el-Sisi for delivering the nation from 
the short-lived Muslim Brotherhood (MB) rule. A 
good example was one called Teslam el-Ayadi or 
May these hands be safe,9 which referred to the 
strong hands of the Armed Forces in toppling the MB 
regime; the song became an embodiment of Egyp-
tian military power in ‘rescuing’ Egypt from the MB 
nightmare. Closure of MB and Salafist media outlets 
in Egypt soon followed. The massive exodus of thou-
sands of MB members and supporters fleeing to Qa-
tar and Turkey allowed many new MB-supporting 
outlets to appear, such as Mekameleen and el-Sharq 
television channels beaming from Turkey. These out-
2 Jennifer WilliaMS. Saudi Arabia and Iran are fighting a proxy war — on Twitter, www.vox.com/2016/9/16/12934170/saudi-arabia-iran-proxy-
war-hajj-twitter
3 www.youtube.com/watch?v=9selhGBPdek
4 MEMRI TV. Iranian Animated Film Simulates Yemeni Missile Attacks on Saudi Oil Fields, Military and Civilian Targets, January 2016 www.
memri.org/tv/iranian-animated-film-simulates-yemeni-missile-attacks-saudi-oil-fields-military-and-civilian
5 www.youtube.com/watch?v=r2mFAJXmVJ8
6 Jailan MaMdouh. “UAE singers convey warning through ‘Tell Qatar’ song,” Egypt Today, 7 November 2017, www.egypttoday.com/Arti-
cle/1/31490/UAE-singers-convey-warning-through-“Tell-Qatar”-song
7 Staff writers. “In pictures: How Saudi Arabia celebrated its 87th national day,” Al Arabiya English, 23 September 2017. http://english.alara-
biya.net/en/features/2017/09/23/IN-PICTURES-How-Saudi-Arabia-celebrated-its-87th-national-day.html
8 Mutaheda (official version) https://vimeo.com/14002184
9 Amina khairy. “Common Sense in Egypt: Teslam El Ayadi,” Egypt Independent, 2014. www.egyptindependent.com/common-sense-egypt-
teslam-el-ayadi/
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lets promoted a cyclical view of history as a repetitive 
series of events by moving the MB up and down the 
ladder of power, as I discuss in a recent analysis of 
the MB media.10 The MB, and indeed other Islamist 
media, usually focus on the metaphor of a constant 
historical battle against Western political and cultural 
incursions. One example of this ‘blame game’ was 
shown in the Arab media response to the Syrian refu-
gee crisis,11 which held Europe responsible for the 
disaster, citing the history of European imperialism in 
the region since the Sykes-Picot agreement. There 
were some media outlets which claimed that Ger-
many only accepted so many Syrian professionals to 
meet their needs for new, cheap labour, thus causing 
a major Syrian ‘brain drain’; other voices blamed the 
Arabs themselves for abandoning their fellow Arabs 
in Syria, in what was seen as contempt for the long-
held slogans promoting Arab fraternity.
Fake News or Fake History?
There are several Arab outlets, particularly Saudi 
Arabia, UAE, Egypt, and Bahrain, which stand in 
opposition to Qatar and Turkey. They have called for 
a revisit of the historical accounts of Ottoman rule 
and its role in ‘weakening the region,’ including 
Egypt, in which historians argue that, Ottoman rule 
imposed isolation on Egypt.12 Likewise, Syrian me-
dia have circulated calls to revise history curricula 
for primary schools to replace positive terms about 
Ottoman rule with negative ones such as ‘usurp-
er’;13 the Syrian government has also been calling to 
stop the flow of Turkish TV series, which used to be 
dubbed in Syrian dialect before being distributed to 
many Arab television networks. The Turkish Presi-
dent Erdogan and the UAE Foreign Minister Sheikh 
Abdullah bin Zayed posted comments on a shared 
tweet on Twitter.14 Their dispute was about whether 
or not Ottoman troops had stolen material wealth 
and manuscripts from Medina, now part of Saudi 
Arabia, in 1916. This tension was exposed yet again 
in December 2017, when the extraordinary summit 
of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC)15 
was held to protest against President Trump’s deci-
sion to recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital. The 
summit was attended by only 16 Heads of State 
and had no representation from several Arab coun-
tries. The upheavals in the region, ever since the 
Arab Spring, were claimed to have drawn the Arab 
leaders into close alliance with Israel, although 
in public, they still declared Israel as the number-
one enemy. Egyptian talk show hosts16 were also 
allegedly briefed by Egypt’s intelligence services 
to tone down opposition to Trump’s decision. 
There are several Arab outlets, 
particularly Saudi Arabia, UAE, 
Egypt, and Bahrain, which stand in 
opposition to Qatar and Turkey
Al-Jazeera Arabic,17 on the other hand, was accused 
of propagating hatred in its coverage of reactions to 
Trump’s decision. The channel found itself embroiled 
in the recent crisis triggering the blockade against 
Qatar; the Arab coalition, led by Saudi Arabia, called 
for the closure of Al-Jazeera and all other Qatari-
owned outlets. The crisis was not about Al-Jazeera 
per se, but an attempt to silence the Qatari voices 
and clip Qatar’s wings regarding its foreign policy. 
The real question is, what Al-Jazeera will look like if it 
survives the current crisis. If it does, it would very like-
ly tone down its coverage of other states in the re-
gion, which means a further loss of its credibility. The 
use of Al-Jazeera as a tool in Qatar’s foreign policy 
10 Noha Mellor. Voice of the Muslim Brotherhood: Da’wa, Discourse, and Political Communication, Routledge, 2018
11 Contradictions in Arab newspapers on dealing with the crisis of Syrian immigrants (in Arabic), 2015 www.bbc.com/arabic/inthe-
press/2015/09/150907_arabic_press_monday
12 www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/1236582
13 https://aawsat.com/home/article/710826
14 Turkey’s Erdogan defends Ottoman commander after UAE minister retweets criticism, in www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-emirates-
medina/turkeys-erdogan-defends-ottoman-commander-after-uae-minister-retweets-criticism-idUSKBN1EE1KW
15 Daoud kuttaB. Istanbul summit exposes divisions within Arab world, www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/12/organization-islamic-
cooperation-meeting-arab-divisions.html
16 David kirkpatrick. Tapes Reveal Egyptian Leaders’ Tacit Acceptance of Jerusalem Move, www.nytimes.com/2018/01/06/world/mid-
dleeast/egypt-jerusalem-talk-shows.html
17 Al Jazeera coverage of Trump’s Jerusalem move ‘promoting hatred,’ www.arabnews.com/node/1207531/media
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only proves that no news outlet in the Arab region is 
truly independent. Al-Jazeera made a huge difference 
to the previously stagnant Arab news market when it 
appeared in 1996 — Arab audiences were following 
outlets like the CNN and BBC for news about their 
region at the time — but it later lost part of its credibil-
ity for its coverage of the Arab uprisings, thus trigger-
ing a wave of resignations18 by presenters and pro-
ducers who claimed the channel’s coverage was 
aligned with Qatar’s foreign policy. Later, Qatar ac-
cused the UAE of hacking Qatar’s state news agen-
cy,19 and planting fake news that led to the recent 
diplomatic rift in the region, which had not happened 
in years. There were also claims that fake news was 
being circulated online, such as that Arab nations had 
demanded that FIFA strip Qatar of the 2022 World 
Cup.20 Al-Jazeera Arabic responded by claiming that, 
Saudi Arabia and UAE wanted to champion a new 
form of “liberal Islam” and a “secularist trend.”21 In re-
taliation, the Saudi television channel Saudi 24 ran a 
whole episode in September 2017, condemning what 
it called “Qatar’s carrying of the banner of Christian 
evangelism,”22 on the grounds that, the Catholic 
Church in the religious complex in Qatar, was part of 
an ongoing strategy to convert Arab Muslims. 
Can Europe Help? 
The chaos and turmoil characterizing the region im-
pelled many Arab states and groups to appeal to the 
EU for support and moderation. The EU was called 
on to mediate, and to help de-escalate the ongoing 
tensions between Qatar, on the one hand, and the 
blockade coalition led by Saudi Arabia, on the other. 
The EU was also called upon to reaffirm its support 
for Lebanon, following the sudden resignation of 
Saad al-Hariri. There have been additional calls for 
the EU to play an active role in reviving the Israeli-
Palestinian peace process, subsequent to the 
American President’s decision to recognize Jerusa-
lem as Israel’s capital, at a time when the EU is still 
battling with an ongoing refugee crisis. 
Al-Jazeera made a huge difference to 
the previously stagnant Arab news 
market when it appeared in 1996 but 
it later lost part of its credibility for its 
coverage of the Arab uprisings
The Arab region has seen tough times during this 
period.23 The collapse of oil prices and dwindling 
revenues in the wealthy Gulf states have resulted in 
Arab expatriates being replaced by natives or a 
cheaper Asian labour force. This has had a negative 
impact on the flow of remittances, which are used to 
subsidize poorer Arab countries. Although the re-
gion’s leaders and populations still blame the cur-
rent morass on decades of meddling in the region 
by the Americans and Europeans, it has become 
impossible not to admit the region’s own weakness-
es in inflicting pain on its own peoples. The preva-
lent insecurity is, moreover, not confined to the Mid-
dle East – in 2014, the region accounted for 45% of 
the world’s terrorist attacks,24 68.5% of its battle-
related deaths, and 57.5% of its refugees.
Meanwhile, Arab media seems to be sticking to its 
customary role: a propaganda tool in the hands of 
statesmen and religious groups stirring not only anti-
Western discourse, but also animosity, often against 
selected neighbouring Arab states, instead of facili-
tating useful debate about possible solutions for the 
current stalemate. There is dwindling hope that Arab 
media will ever be able to separate itself from the en-
suing political upheaval, despite the huge amount of 
European funding being poured into training Arab 
journalists and supporting various media projects. 
18 Adam taylor. REPORT: 22 Staffers Resign At Al-Jazeera Over Claims Of Biased Coverage In Egypt, 2013. www.businessinsider.com/
al-jazeera-resignations-reported-in-egypt-2013-7?IR=T
19 Catherine philp. UAE ‘planted fake news to trigger Qatar crisis,’ www.thetimes.co.uk/article/emiratis-planted-fake-news-to-trigger-qatar-
crisis-08qd5d08g
20 Qatar 2022: Fake news story claims Arab nations told Fifa they will boycott World Cup, www.bbc.com/sport/football/40626063
21 www.aljazeera.net/programs/newsreports/2017/7/29 In Arabic
22 www.youtube.com/watch?v=nfO_C5d03eM&t=3s In Arabic
23 The Arab winter, www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21685503-five-years-after-wave-uprisings-arab-world-worse-ever
24 UNDP. Arab Human Development Report 2016, Youth and the Prospects for Human Development in a Changing Reality, www.arabstates.
undp.org/content/dam/rbas/report/AHDR%20Reports/AHDR%202016/AHDR%20Final%202016/AHDR2016En.pdf
